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This study examines how a monitoring system that constrains account-
ing manipulation affects shareholder value and managerial rents. Although it
is generally argued that constraining manipulation via monitoring alleviates
effort control problems, this study demonstrates that monitoring can make
it more, not less, costly to induce high managerial effort. The key intuition
is that the optimal contract incentivizes managers to manipulate accounting
reports to influence project continuation decisions. More importantly, when
manipulation is costly, management’s manipulation incentives increase in the
level of productive effort. This result implies that allowing accounting manipu-
lation can make it more attractive for managers to exert high productive effort.
Consequently, restricting manipulation via monitoring can increase the cost of
incentive contracting, which reduces shareholder value. In addition, monitor-
ing discourages managers from engaging in costly manipulation activities and
thus can increase managerial rents. The analysis also shows that monitoring
vii
can increase shareholder value and managerial rents simultaneously, suggest-
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Accounting manipulation is generally viewed as an action that benefits
managers at the expense of shareholders. One aspect of this argument sug-
gests that accounting manipulation exacerbates effort control problems (e.g.
Feltham and Xie 1994, Goldman and Slezak 2006). Intuitively, accounting
manipulation makes it more difficult to induce high managerial effort because
managers can manipulate information to achieve desirable performance mea-
surement reports instead of exerting high effort to improve actual performance.
Constraining manipulation via monitoring therefore makes it easier to induce
high managerial effort and reduces the cost of incentive contracting. In this
study, I demonstrate that, under certain conditions, restricting manipulation
via monitoring can make it more difficult to induce high managerial effort.
The key driver behind this result is that managers have incentives to ma-
nipulate accounting reports to influence project continuation decisions. More
importantly, given that manipulation is costly, management’s manipulation
incentives increase in the level of productive effort. Allowing managers to ma-
nipulate the report increases the likelihood they will obtain a bonus, but it
increases more quickly when they exert high effort than when they exert low
effort. Consequently, constraining manipulation via monitoring can make it
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less attractive for managers to exert high effort, resulting in an increase in the
cost of incentive contracting.
One implication of the finding that monitoring can aggravate effort con-
trol problems is that shareholders may not always prefer a strong monitoring
system, even when monitoring is costless. In a similar vein, managers may
not always prefer a weak monitoring system because monitoring can increase
managerial rents. The analysis also shows that a monitoring system that con-
strains manipulation activities can simultaneously increase both shareholder
value and managerial rents, suggesting that shareholders and managers do
not always have different preferences for an optimal monitoring system. As
a consequence, organizational changes that shift the relative power between
managers and shareholders do not necessarily trigger changes in monitoring
intensity.
I consider a principal-agent model in which shareholders hire a manager
to work on an investment project. At the beginning of the game, shareholders
and the manager jointly determine the level of monitoring intensity. Sharehold-
ers then offer an incentive contract to induce unobservable managerial effort
that improves project quality. At an interim stage, the manager privately ob-
serves a signal that provides information about project quality, although this
signal is not perfectly accurate. The manager can manipulate this signal by
incurring a personal cost, which is determined by the level of manipulation
and the intensity of monitoring. Higher-intensity monitoring causes higher
marginal cost of manipulation. Shareholders observe a potentially manipu-
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lated signal in the form of an interim accounting report and have the right
to decide whether to continue or to liquidate the project. If the project is
continued, a long-term investment outcome will be realized.
Shareholders rely on interim accounting information to make a project
continuation decision. If shareholders could directly observe the interim signal,
it would be first-best optimal for them to liquidate the project when the interim
signal is unfavorable and to continue it otherwise. Accounting manipulation
reduces the efficiency of this project continuation decision because it distorts
the quality of interim accounting information. As a consequence, constraining
manipulation via monitoring improves the quality of interim accounting in-
formation and thus improves shareholders’ ability to correctly decide whether
to continue or to liquidate the project. Based on this argument, monitoring
improves investment efficiency and therefore increases shareholder value.
Although monitoring always improves investment efficiency, its impact
on incentive contracts depends on the contracting environment. In the bench-
mark setting in which investment outcomes are not contractible, the manager
is given a bonus when the interim accounting report is favorable. In this case,
manipulation and productive effort are substitutes because the likelihood that
the manager will manipulate the report decreases as the level of productive
effort increases. Therefore, allowing the manager to manipulate the report re-
duces the manager’s incentive to supply high productive effort, resulting in an
increase in the cost of incentive contracting as well as an increase in managerial
rents. Put differently, constraining manipulation via monitoring reduces the
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cost of incentive contracting and managerial rents, consistent with the con-
ventional view that monitoring reduces agency conflicts between shareholders
and managers.
When investment outcomes can be used for contracting purposes, how-
ever, the manager is given a bonus only for long-term success which can be
achieved only when the project is continued. As a result, the manager has an
incentive to manipulate the interim report to convince shareholders to con-
tinue the project. Although managerial effort decreases the likelihood that
the manager will manipulate the report, it increases the manipulation level
when the manager actually does manipulate the report. This result follows
because, when determining the manipulation level, the manager faces a trade-
off between the benefit and the cost of manipulation. The expected benefit
of manipulation increases in the likelihood of obtaining the bonus if manip-
ulation is successful while the cost of manipulation increases in the level of
manipulation. As the productive effort level increases, the likelihood that the
project succeeds increases, and the manager’s expected benefit from manipu-
lation increases. Therefore, the manager optimally chooses a higher level of
manipulation when he exerts high effort than when he exerts low effort. This
result implies that allowing manipulation increases the probability that the
manager is rewarded a bonus more quickly when he exerts high effort than
when he exerts low effort, suggesting that manipulation reduces the bonus
required to induce high managerial effort. Nevertheless, manipulation also
increases the likelihood that the manager obtains the bonus. I show that
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when the difference in manipulation incentives between a manager who ex-
erts high and low effort is large or when the equilibrium manipulation level
is low, the effect of manipulation in reducing the bonus level dominates its
effect in increasing the probability that the manager obtains the bonus such
that restricting manipulation via monitoring leads to an increase in expected
compensation. In addition, a monitoring system that makes it difficult to ma-
nipulate the report benefits the manager because it increases the bonus level
as well as discourages him from engaging in manipulation activities, resulting
in a reduction in expected manipulation costs. As a consequence, constraining
manipulation via monitoring increases managerial rents.
Taken as a whole, these results show that shareholders may find it
optimal to implement a weak monitoring system even when there is no di-
rect cost associated with the implementation of a strong monitoring system.
When shareholders cannot use long-term investment outcomes for contract-
ing purposes, monitoring always increases shareholder value as it improves
investment efficiency and alleviates effort control problems. However, when
long-term investment outcomes are contractible, monitoring sometimes de-
creases shareholder value because it can exacerbate effort control problems
and thus increase expected compensation. Similarly, managers may find it op-
timal to implement a strong monitoring system because monitoring increases
managerial rents when investment outcomes are contractible. These results
suggest that as the relative degree of managerial influence over a monitoring
system increases, the monitoring system can become stronger, not weaker.
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In addition, monitoring can increase both shareholder value and managerial
rents simultaneously because it reduces the deadweight loss associated with
expected manipulation cost and inefficient investment decisions, and this gain
is shared between shareholders and managers. Consequently, shareholders and
managers do not always have different preferences in terms of optimal mon-
itoring systems. The results of this study also show that shareholder value
can be maximized in the presence of high managerial rents, weak monitoring,
high manipulation, or high expected compensation, whereas managerial rents
can be maximized when expected compensation is low. Finally, a monitoring
system that constrains accounting manipulation always decreases the manip-
ulation level but can either increase or decrease the bonus level. Therefore,
the relationship between the level of bonus and manipulation incentive can be
either positive or negative.
This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses prior literature re-
lated to this study. Chapter 3 describes the model and assumptions. Chapter
4 shows the effects of monitoring on optimal contracting, expected compen-
sation, and managerial rents when investment outcomes are not contractible
while Chapter 5 shows these effects when investment outcomes are contractible.
The effect of monitoring on investment efficiency is shown in Chapter 6. Chap-
ter 7 shows the optimal monitoring system given the relative degree of influence
over a monitoring system between shareholders and managers. I discuss the
empirical implications of the model in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 concludes the




In this chapter, I discuss prior research related to this study. One of the
key features of the model in the present study is that shareholders use interim
information to make a project continuation decision and for incentive con-
tracting. The model used in this study modifies the capital financing model
used in Dessi (2005) in which an agent’s effort affects investment outcomes
and the interim information is used for a project continuation decision as well
as for contracting purposes. Dessi (2005) assumes that the interim informa-
tion is either publicly observable or privately observed by the agent. I modify
this assumption by assuming that there is an accounting system that reduces
information asymmetry between a principal and an agent. However, this infor-
mation is not perfectly accurate because of exogenous noise and manipulation
incentives. In addition, while Dessi (2005) focuses on deriving optimal fi-
nancing contracts, the emphasis in this paper is on the effects of constraining
manipulation via monitoring on shareholder value and managerial rents.
Prior literature that examines the agency problem and accounting ma-
nipulation includes Feltham and Xie (1994), Goldman and Slezak (2006),
Crocker and Slemrod (2007), and Laux (2014). Feltham and Xie (1994) con-
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sider a setting in which an agent can take productive actions and unproductive
actions–both of which affect contractible performance measures while gross
payoff is not contractible. They show that an agent’s opportunity to take un-
productive actions (i.e. accounting manipulation) reduce the surplus because
it imposes additional risk on productive effort as well as increases the cost of
unproductive actions. Therefore, allowing manipulation increases the cost of
incentive contracting required to induce the same level of productive effort.
Goldman and Slezak (2006) examine the relation between accounting manipu-
lation and stock-based compensation. They show that stock-based compensa-
tion is a double-edged sword because it not only induces productive effort but
also incentivizes the manager to engage in manipulation activities. As a conse-
quence, accounting manipulation makes it harder to induce managerial effort.
Crocker and Slemrod (2007) examine the relation between compensation con-
tracts contingent on reported earnings and managerial incentive. They show
it is impossible to design such a contract that can incentivize the manager
to maximize firm profits and to truthfully report these profits. Laux (2014)
considers a setting in which long-term project payoffs can be used for contract-
ing purposes. He assumes that the informativeness of the private information
observed by the manager does not depend on the productive effort level and
shows that allowing manipulation always increases the cost of incentive con-
tracting. Overall, these prior studies show that constraining manipulation via
monitoring alleviates effort control problems and reduces the cost of incentive
contracting, consistent with conventional wisdom. In the present study, I ex-
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amine the relationships between a monitoring system, shareholder value, and
managerial rents under different contracting environments and show that the
contractibility of investment outcomes affects these relationships. In addition,
while prior studies have shown that constraining manipulation via monitoring
alleviates effort control problems, I show that it can aggravate, rather than
alleviate, these problems.
In addition, this study can be linked to prior literature that shows the
benefits of accounting manipulation to shareholders. Arya et al. (1998) con-
sider a setting in which the principal can fire the agent at will and show that
allowing managers to manipulate accounting information protects them from
being dismissed early and thus may reduce the cost to induce them to ac-
cept employment contracts. Similarly, Demski (1998) shows that firms benefit
from earnings management that results in income smoothing when managers
are allowed to smooth income if and only if he works hard in all periods. Dutta
and Gigler (2002) show that it is not always optimal to design the accounting
system to prevent accounting manipulation because accounting manipulation
makes it easier to elicit truthful forecasts from managers. Considering a trade-
off between productive effort and manipulation effort, Demski et al. (2004)
show that it may be optimal for principals to facilitate the accounting manipu-
lation process because it reduces agents’ manipulation incentives and alleviates
effort control problems. Liang (2004) considers an interaction between a risk-
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent and shows that manipulation can
reduce the variability of compensation across periods and thus reduce the risk
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premium paid to the agent. Finally, Drymiotes (2008) shows that it may be
optimal to allow managers to influence their performance evaluation in order
to lower managerial compensation costs. Although these papers show that
manipulation can be beneficial to shareholders, the intuitions behind these
results are different from the intuition in the present study which argues that
the manager manipulates the report to convince shareholders to continue the
project and that this manipulation incentive increases in the level of manage-
rial effort. Consequently, manipulation can make it more attractive for the
manager to exert high effort, resulting in lower costs of incentive contracting.
In addition, unlike prior studies that show the benefits of accounting manipu-
lation to shareholders, this study analyzes the impacts of monitoring on both
shareholder value and managerial rents simultaneously in order to provide a
better understanding of how shifts in the relative power between shareholders
and managers affect monitoring intensity.
Prior literature also shows that accounting manipulation can benefit
shareholders through managers’ private information. Specifically, Chaney and
Lewis (1995) show that managers engage in accounting manipulation activ-
ities to signal their private information about the true value of companies.
This argument suggests that accounting manipulation can increase the in-
formativeness of accounting reports with respect to firm value and thus can
improve investment decisions. In this paper, although the manager’s ma-
nipulation incentive is similar to signalling behaviors in the sense that the
manipulation incentive increases in the effort level, manipulation does not di-
10
rectly benefit shareholders because manipulation always distorts investment
efficiency. Rather, I show that this manipulation incentive can benefit share-
holders because it can alleviate effort control problems and thus reduce the




This chapter outlines the setup of the main model. I consider a model
with two risk-neutral players in a firm—a manager and shareholders. The
firm has an investment project and the quality of the project depends on the
manager’s unobservable effort. Thus, in order to induce high managerial effort,
shareholders must offer an incentive contract.
3.1 Timing
There are four dates: t0, t1, t2, and t3. At t0, a manager and sharehold-
ers implement a monitoring system. The intensity of the monitoring system is
jointly determined by both parties. At t1, shareholders offer the manager an
incentive contract, and the manager chooses an unobservable effort choice that
affects project quality. At t2, the manager privately observes a signal that pro-
vides information about project quality and can manipulate it. Shareholders
observe potentially manipulated information and decide whether to continue
or to liquidate the project. At t3, an investment outcome is realized. Figure
3.1 depicts the timeline of the model.
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of the Model
3.2 Investment Projects and Productive Effort
The firm has an investment project which can be a high quality project
(λh) or a low quality project (λl). The quality of the project cannot be observed
by any parties but can be inferred after observing investment outcomes because
a high quality project yields a high outcome of R > 0 while a low quality
project yields a low outcome of 0. The quality of the project depends on
unobservable managerial effort. If the manager exerts high effort (referred to
as “a working manager”), he incurs a personal cost of b > 0 and the probability
13
that project quality is high is ph. However, if the manager chooses low effort
(referred to as “a shirking manager”), the probability that project quality is
high is reduced to pl, 1 > ph > pl > 0, but he does not incur any personal
cost of effort. As is common in agency problem literature, I assume that it is
optimal for shareholders to induce the manager to exert high effort. This is the
case, for example, when R is sufficiently large or when b is sufficiently small.1
Figure 3.2 shows how managerial effort affects project quality and investment
outcomes.
3.3 Information, Manipulation Activities, and Monitor-
ing Technology
At t2, the manager privately observes a binary signal, s ∈ {sh, sl},
that provides information about project quality, λ. The accuracy of the signal
is exogenously given and is denoted by q ∈ (0.5, 1) such that Pr (sh|λh) =
Pr (sl|λl) = q and Pr (sl|λh) = Pr (sh|λl) = (1− q).2 After observing the
signal, the manager can choose whether or not to engage in accounting manip-
ulation activities, which distort the information contained in the accounting
report, θ ∈ {θh, θl}. If the manager chooses not to manipulate the information,
the report is truthful in the sense that when the signal is high (sh), the report
1In equilibrium, the manager always exerts high effort and, therefore, a shirking manager
does not exist. Nevertheless, analyzing actions taken by a shirking manager is necessary
because shareholders have to design an incentive contract to prevent the manager from
exerting low effort.
2The assumption that the signal is, on average, unbiased is not crucial for the analysis.
The qualitative results in this study continue to hold as long as Pr (sh|λh) ∈ (0.5, 1) and
Pr (sl|λl) ∈ (0.5, 1). One example is a conservative signal where Pr (sl|λh) > Pr (sh|λl).
14
Figure 3.2: Effort and Investment Outcomes
is θh and when the signal is low (sl), the report is θl. If, however, the manager
privately chooses a manipulation level m ∈ [0, 1] by incurring a personal cost
of 0.5km2, the accounting report is distorted (i.e. the report is θl when s = sh
and θh when s = sl) with probability m and is truthful with probability 1−m.
Figure 3.3 depicts the information environment in this model.
The parameter k represents the monitoring intensity, k ∈ [kmin, kmax],
kmin > k0 > 0 where k0 is defined in Appendix B.
3 The assumption that
3To focus on the effects of monitoring on accounting manipulation, incentive contracting,
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Figure 3.3: Information Environment
k ≥ kmin reflects the notion that firms must implement some forms of monitor-
ing to satisfy regulatory requirements. For example, companies must prepare
their financial reports under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
and these reports must be audited by external auditors. In addition, the SEC
shareholder value, and managerial rents, I define monitoring as a mechanism that constrains
accounting manipulation activities. Other definitions of monitoring used in prior studies
include the ability to identify the manager’s ability or type (e.g. Cremer 1995, Hermalin
and Weisbach 1998, Laux 2017), the ability to identify the manager’s effort level (Huddart
1993), the ability to find a replacement manager (Almazan et al. 2005), and the precision
of information (Drymiotes 2007).
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requires companies to disclose whether their audit committees include at least
one financial expert (SEC 2003). Although these requirements are in place,
they represent minimum requirements that firms must satisfy, and firms have
discretion in implementing a more intense monitoring system, k > kmin. As
an example, firms can design a stricter internal control system, include more
independent members in their boards of directors, or include more financial
experts in their audit committees. The focus of this study is on discretionary
monitoring. I assume that monitoring is costless but k is jointly determined
by the manager and shareholders at t0.
4 The assumption that both the man-
ager and shareholders can influence monitoring intensity can be motivated by
the observation that shareholders do not have full control over a monitoring
system, as evidenced by a substantial role of management in appointing di-
rectors (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). To determine the optimal monitoring
system, the manager proposes his preferred monitoring intensity, kM , while
shareholders propose their preferred monitoring system, kS. The implemented
monitoring intensity is k = αkM + (1− α) kS where α ∈ (0, 1) represents the
relative degree of managerial influence over a monitoring system. Once the
monitoring system is implemented, it remains in place until t2, after the ac-
counting system generates the accounting report. This assumption reflects
the notion that monitoring technology cannot be changed in the short run.
4In reality, monitoring is likely costly and the cost of monitoring can be another factor
that determines optimal monitoring intensity. I abstract away from costly monitoring to fo-
cus on the relationship between the relative degree of managerial influence over a monitoring
system and the optimal monitoring intensity.
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All variables, except project quality, the signal, the manager’s effort, and the
manipulation level, are publicly observable.
3.4 Project Continuation Decisions
At t2, after the accounting system generates the accounting report,
shareholders decide whether to continue or to liquidate the project. If the
project is continued, the investment outcome, either R or 0, is realized at t3. In
contrast, if the project is liquidated, it yields a liquidation value of L at t2 and
no investment outcome is realized at t3. To ensure that accounting information






> L ≥ Pr (λh|sl, ph)R. As will become clear later, this
assumption implies that shareholders find it optimal to continue the project
when θ = θh and to liquidate it when θ = θl.
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3.5 Incentive Contracts
Shareholders offer a compensation contract to induce managerial effort.
The pay plan takes the form W = (w (θh) , w (θl) , w (R) , w (0) , w (L)). This
pay plan is based on contractible information which includes the accounting
report, θ ∈ {θh, θl}, the investment outcome (R or 0), and the liquidation
value (L). In equilibrium, the project is liquidated when θ = θl, implying that
the manager’s pay when the accounting report is low is the same as his pay
5The proof of the optimal project continuation decision is provided in Appendix B.
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when the project is liquidated, w (θl) = w (L). Therefore, the optimal pay
plan can be simplified to W = (w (θh) , w (θl) , w (R) , w (0)). The manager is
protected by limited liability such that all payments must be non-negative,
w (·) ≥ 0. Given the project continuation decision described above, if θ =
θh, the manager’s pay is either w (θh) + w (R) (if the project yields the high
outcome) or w (θh) + w (0) (if the project yields the low outcome), and if
θ = θl, the manager receives w (θl). The shareholders’ objective is to maximize
shareholder value:
V = Π− C,




Monitoring and Incentive Contracting:
Non-Contractible Investment Outcomes
In this chapter, I show the effects of monitoring on incentive contracting
in the benchmark setting in which investment outcomes cannot be used for
contracting purposes. The assumption that long-term investment outcomes
are not contractible is commonly used in prior literature in earnings manage-
ment (e.g. Feltham and Xie 1994, Goldman and Slezak 2006, Crocker and
Slemrod 2007) and can be motivated by various reasons. For example, invest-
ment outcomes may not be realized until far enough in the future such that
it is not feasible to offer managerial compensation contracts based on these
outcomes. When the investment outcomes are not contractible, the pay plan
is based on the interim accounting report, θ ∈ {θh, θl}. Suppose the man-
ager is offered fixed pay, w (θh) = w (θl). If this is the case, the manager will
have no incentives to manipulate the accounting report. Although this incen-
tive contract eliminates the manager’s incentive to manipulate the report, this
contract is not optimal because it also eliminates the manager’s incentive to
supply high productive effort. Therefore, under the optimal contract, the man-
ager will have an incentive to manipulate the accounting report. The following
proposition describes the characteristics of the optimal incentive contract.
20
Proposition 4.1. When the investment outcomes are not contractible,







and w (θl) = 0, and
(ii) the manipulation level is m = w(θh)
k
.
The results in Proposition 4.1 show the optimal pay plan and the ma-
nipulation level when the investment outcomes are not contractible. To maxi-
mize the manager’s incentive to exert high effort, the contract offers minimum
payment to the manager when the interim report is low, θ = θl. Due to
the manager’s limited liability, it is therefore optimal to offer w (θl) = 0 and
w (θh) > 0.
1 With this optimal pay plan, the manager chooses not to ma-
nipulate the report when the signal is high, s = sh, but chooses to distort
the information when the signal is low, s = sl. Although the manipulation
level is the same regardless of the manager’s effort choice, the probability that
the manager engages in accounting manipulation activities decreases when the
effort level increases.
As monitoring becomes more intense (k increases), it is more costly to
manipulate the accounting report. In response, the manager reduces his ma-
nipulation level, dm
dk
< 0. This reduction in m makes shirking an unattractive
option for the manager because it becomes much harder to obtain the bonus by
shirking when the manipulation opportunity is limited. Constraining manip-
ulation via monitoring therefore increases the attractiveness of exerting high
1Throughout this paper, I refer to the manager’s pay when the accounting report is
high or when the project succeeds as a bonus. An alternative interpretation of this form of
contract is a stock option plan in which the option is in the money only when the report is
high or when the project yields a high outcome.
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effort for the manager and reduces the optimal bonus level required to induce
managerial effort, w (θh). The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 4.2. When the investment outcomes are not contractible, as k
increases, the bonus level required to induce high managerial effort and the
manipulation level decrease, dw(θh)
dk
< 0 and dm
dk
< 0.
Given the optimal contract and the manipulation level shown in Propo-
sition 4.1, expected compensation, Cno, can be written as
Cno = (Pr (sh|ph) + Pr (sl|ph)m)w (θh) , (4.1)
where “no” stands for non-contractible outcomes. An increase in k has two
effects on expected compensation—a decrease in the bonus level, dw(θh)
dk
< 0,
and a decrease in the likelihood the manager obtains the bonus due to a lower
manipulation level, dm
dk
< 0. Both effects work in the same direction such that
an increase in k leads to a decrease in expected compensation, dCno
dk
< 0.
Similar to (4.1), the manager’s expected rent (Uno) is





Substituting m and w (θh) from Proposition 4.1 into (4.2) and rearranging the
terms, yields
Uno = w (θh)−
Pr (sl|pl) b
(ph − pl) (2q − 1)
. (4.3)
Equation (4.3) shows that the manager’s expected rent depends on the bonus
level, w (θh). Since w (θh) decreases in k, the manager’s expected rent also
decreases in k. These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.3. When the investment outcomes are not contractible, as k
increases,
(i) expected compensation decreases, dCno
dk
< 0, and
(ii) managerial rents decrease, dUno
dk
< 0.
The results in Proposition 4.3 are consistent with the conventional view
that monitoring reduces expected compensation and managerial rents.
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Chapter 5
Monitoring and Incentive Contracting:
Contractible Investment Outcomes
In Chapter 4, I show that when investment outcomes are not con-
tractible, monitoring makes it more attractive for the manager to exert high
productive effort and thus reduces the cost of incentive contracting. In this
chapter, however, I show that this result does not necessarily hold. Specifi-
cally, in this chapter, I return to the main assumption outlined in Chapter 3
that investment outcomes can be used for contracting purposes. When invest-
ment outcomes are contractible, shareholders can offer compensation contracts
based on the accounting report (θh and θl) and the long-term investment out-
come (R and 0). That is, the incentive contract consists of w (θh), w (θl),
w (R), and w (0). Given that shareholders continue (liquidate) the project
when θ = θh (θ = θl), if s = sl and the manager does not manipulate the re-
port, his compensation is w (θl). On the other hand, if s = sl and the manager
successfully manipulates the report, he receives not only the payment when the
report is high, w (θh), but also the payment based on the investment outcome,
either w (R) or w (0). Therefore, expected compensation of the manager who
24
observes sl and successfully manipulates the report is
w (θh) + Pr (λh|sl, p)w (R) + Pr (λl|sl, p)w (0) .
Assume for now, and I will show later, that the following condition holds:
w (θh)+Pr (λh|sl, p)w (R)+Pr (λl|sl, p)w (0) > w (θl) for p ∈ {ph, pl} . (5.1)
Condition (5.1) states that if the manager observes sl, his expected compensa-
tion when he successfully manipulates the report is greater than his pay when
he does not manipulate the report, regardless of his effort level. This condition
implies that if the manager observes sh, he will not manipulate the accounting
report but if he observes sl, he will choose the manipulation level, m, that
maximizes the following function.
Uco (sl) = m (w (θh) + Pr (λh|sl, p)w (R) + Pr (λl|sl, p)w (0))
+ (1−m)w (θl)− 0.5km2.
The notation “co” refers to contractible outcomes.
Using the first-order condition, the manipulation level is
m =
w (θh) + Pr (λh|sl, p)w (R) + Pr (λl|sl, p)w (0)− w (θl)
k
. (5.2)
I show that when k ≥ kmin, the optimal contract sets w (R) > 0 and
w (θh) = w (θl) = w (0) = 0.
1 The intuition is as follows. To maximize the
1One real-world example of a compensation contract that rewards managers based on
long-term investment outcomes is a contract that ties managers’ pays to firms’ earnings
growth.
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manager’s incentive to choose high effort and to minimize expected compensa-
tion, it is optimal to reward the manager only when the outcome is the most
informative about managerial effort. Since the investment outcome is directly
linked to the manager’s effort, it is optimal to reward the manager only when
the investment outcome is high, w (R) > 0. Setting w (θh) > 0 is not optimal
because it incentivizes the manager to choose low effort and manipulate the
report to obtain the bonus rather than to exert high effort in the first place.
Similarly, offering w (0) > 0 incentivizes the manager to choose low effort be-
cause it is more likely that the project yields the low outcome when he exerts
low effort than when he exerts high effort.
Now consider the manager’s pay when θ = θl. By offering w (θl) > 0,
the manager’s incentive to exert high effort is weakened because the manager is
more likely to have a low interim report when he chooses low effort than when
he chooses high effort. Therefore, setting w (θl) > 0 increases the bonus level
required to induce high effort, w (R), and increases expected compensation.
Nevertheless, as will be shown later in Chapter 6, offering w (θl) > 0 can
be useful because it reduces manipulation incentives and thus improves the
efficiency of the project continuation decision. However, when k ≥ kmin, the
cost from an increase in the expected compensation outweighs the benefit from
the improvement in the project continuation decision efficiency, suggesting that
it is not optimal to reward the manager when θ = θl, w (θl) = 0.
2
2To my knowledge, no prior empirical studies document the role of ex ante severance
agreements (similar to w (θl) in this model) in reducing manipulation incentives. This lack
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Substituting w (θh) = w (θl) = w (0) = 0 from the optimal contract
into (5.2), we obtain the following manipulation level.
m =
Pr (λh|sl, p)w (R)
k
. (5.3)
The following proposition summarizes the optimal contract and the
manipulation level when the investment outcomes are contractible.
Proposition 5.1. When the investment outcomes are contractible,
(i) w (R) = k
−(ph−pl)q+√(ph−pl)2q2+ 2b(1−q)(ph Pr(λh|sl,ph)−pl Pr(λh|sl,pl))k
(1−q)(ph Pr(λh|sl,ph)−pl Pr(λh|sl,pl))
, w (θh) =
w (θl) = w (0) = 0, and
(ii) the manipulation level is m = Pr(λh|sl,p)w(R)
k
.
Proposition 5.1 presents an interesting result regarding management’s
manipulation incentives. Unlike the result in Proposition 4.1, the manipula-
tion level shown in Proposition 5.1 not only depends on the bonus, w (R), and
the monitoring intensity, k, but also depends on the probability that project
quality is high when s = sl, Pr (λh|sl, p). When the investment outcomes are
contractible, the manager who observes sl will obtain the bonus if and only
if he successfully manipulates the report and possesses a high quality project.
Due to the unobservability of the true project quality, the manager updates
of empirical evidence is consistent with the argument in Arya et al. (1998) that severance
pay is a costly mechanism and is not likely used to reduce manipulation activities. Prior
empirical literature shows that firms use ex ante severance agreements to motivate risk
taking (Cadman et al. 2016, Rau and Xu 2013, Rusticus 2006) but corporate governance
has no effect on the probability of having a severance agreement (Rusticus 2006).
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his belief about the probability that the project will yield the high outcome
based on the signal and his effort level. Specifically, when s = sl, the probabil-
ity that the investment outcome is high is greater when the manager chooses
high effort than when he chooses low effort. The implication of this result
is that, after observing sl, a working manager will choose a higher manip-






. In other words, when the investment outcomes are
contractible, the productive effort and the manipulation incentive are comple-
ments, rather than substitutes. As a monitoring system becomes more intense,
the manipulation level decreases, and it decreases more quickly for a working




< 0. Note that the manager
always works in equilibrium and thus the equilibrium manipulation level is mh.
The following lemma summarizes the results with respect to the manipulation
level.
Lemma 5.2. When the investment outcomes are contractible, the manip-
ulation level increases in the effort level, mh > ml. As k increases, the






It is now useful to discuss the relationship between manipulation, the
project continuation decision, and the optimal incentive contract. Recall that
when θ = θl, the project is liquidated and the manager receives nothing,
w (θl) = 0. If it is not possible to manipulate the report, the project is al-
ways liquidated when s = sl. Thus, the manager that possesses a high quality
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project and observes sl is unintentionally penalized by the inaccuracy of the
signal because he would receive the bonus, w (R), if the project were contin-
ued. This penalty discourages the manager from choosing high effort because
the manager is more likely to have a high quality project when he exerts high
effort than when he chooses low effort. Accounting manipulation ensures the
continuity of the project and reduces the likelihood of this penalty. Conse-
quently, accounting manipulation makes it more attractive for the manager to
supply high productive effort.
In addition, as shown in Lemma 5.2, the incentive to override the ac-
counting system to convince shareholders to continue the project is stronger
for a working manager than for a shirking manager, mh > ml. As a monitoring
system becomes more intense, the manipulation level decreases at a faster rate
for mh than for ml. This result implies that monitoring reduces the likelihood
the project is continued, and this effect is stronger when the manager exerts
high effort than when he exerts low effort. Consequently, constraining ma-
nipulation via monitoring reduces the attractiveness of working, resulting in
an increase in the bonus level required to induce high managerial effort. The
following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5.3. When the investment outcomes are contractible, as k in-




Proposition 5.3 presents a counter-intuitive result. Generally, the man-
ager’s ability to manipulate the accounting report reduces the informative-
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ness of contractible information with respect to managerial effort because it
is difficult to determine whether a favorable performance report is a result of
managerial effort or a result of manipulation activities, as shown in Proposi-
tion 4.2. However, I show that, when the investment outcomes can be used
for contracting purposes, the manager’s opportunity to manipulate the re-
port increases the informativeness of contractible information with respect to
managerial effort, resulting in a decrease in the optimal bonus level.
Although constraining accounting manipulation via monitoring increases
the level of bonus required to induce high managerial effort, its effect on ex-
pected compensation is less clear. Similar to (4.1), expected compensation
when the investment outcomes are contractible can be expressed as
Cco = (phq + ph (1− q)mh)w (R) . (5.4)
An increase in k has two opposing effects on expected compensation.
On the one hand, as monitoring becomes more intense, the manipulation level
decreases, resulting in a decrease in the probability that the manager receives
the bonus (the negative effect). On the other hand, as shown in Proposition
5.3, an increase in k increases the bonus level (the positive effect). Therefore,
the net effect of k on expected compensation is ambiguous.
To better understand the two forces that affect the relationship be-
tween monitoring and expected compensation, consider another benchmark
case in which manipulation imposes no cost to the manager but the maximum





In this case, the manipulation incentive is independent of the effort choice as
the manager always chooses the manipulation level m0 (k). With this ma-
nipulation incentive, when k is sufficiently high, the optimal bonus level is
w (R) = b
(ph−pl)(q+(1−q)m0(k))
. In addition, expected compensation is




which does not depend on the monitoring level,
dCm0(k)
dk
= 0. This implies that,
when there is no relationship between manipulation incentive and effort choice,
the effects of monitoring in increasing the bonus level and in decreasing the
likelihood that the manager obtains the bonus cancel each other out such that
monitoring does not affect expected compensation. Similarly, the manager’s
expected rent is unaffected by a change in monitoring intensity because (i)
monitoring does not affect expected compensation and (ii) manipulation is
costless. The following lemma summarizes the results in this benchmark case.
Lemma 5.4. When the investment outcomes are contractible, manipulation is















The results in Lemma 5.4 no longer hold when management’s manipu-
lation incentives depend on the effort level. Specifically, the directional effect
of monitoring on expected compensation depends on the sign of the following
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term:
pl (mh −ml)− (ph − pl)mh. (5.5)
Condition 5.5 shows that the relation between monitoring and expected
compensation is positive when (mh −ml) is large or when mh is small. Re-
call that, when long-term investment outcomes are contractible, constraining
manipulation via monitoring increases the bonus level required to induce high
managerial effort, dw(R)
dk
> 0, but decreases the likelihood the manager re-
ceives the bonus due to a decrease in the manipulation level, dmh
dk
< 0. When
(mh −ml) is large, the manager finds it more attractive to exert high manage-
rial effort because the likelihood he obtains the bonus significantly increases
when he exerts high effort. Consequently, it is optimal for shareholders to allow
the manager to manipulate the report because doing so significantly reduces
the bonus level required to induce high managerial effort and thus reduces ex-
pected compensation, dCco
dk
> 0. On the other hand, when (mh −ml) is small,
allowing manipulation only marginally decreases the bonus level. Therefore,
constraining manipulation via monitoring decreases expected compensation
because it marginally increases the bonus level but significantly decreases the
likelihood the manager obtains the bonus, dCco
dk
< 0.
Similarly, when mh is small, the likelihood that the manager obtains
the bonus is low. As a result, allowing manipulation reduces expected compen-
sation because the likelihood the manager obtains the bonus only marginally
increases, suggesting a positive association between monitoring and expected
compensation, dCco
dk
> 0. In contrast, when mh is large, shareholders are better
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off restricting manipulation activities to reduce the likelihood the manager ob-
tains the bonus. Thus, when mh is large, a monitoring system that constrains
accounting manipulation reduces expected compensation, dCco
dk
< 0. The anal-
ysis shows that, holding ph and q constant, expected compensation decreases
in monitoring intensity (Condition (5.5) is negative) when pl is sufficiently
low. However, when pl is sufficiently high, implementing a strong monitoring
system increases expected compensation (Condition (5.5) is positive).
Using (5.3) and (5.4), the manager’s expected rent is





The manager’s expected rent is a function of expected compensation,
Cco, and expected manipulation cost, 0.5km
2
h. Consider first the effect of
monitoring on expected manipulation cost. As k increases, the marginal cost
of manipulation increases. This, however, does not imply that expected ma-
nipulation cost will also increase. Holding other things constant, monitoring
increases expected manipulation cost. But other things cannot be held con-
stant. Specifically, the manager responds to an increase in k by reducing
the manipulation level, resulting in a decrease in expected manipulation cost.
To understand the intuition, consider an extreme case when manipulation is
prohibitively costly, k → ∞. In this case, the manager will choose not to
manipulate the report, mh = 0, suggesting that the manager does not incur
any manipulation costs. As k decreases, the manipulation level increases, and
so does the expected cost of manipulation incurred by the manager.
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Although monitoring always decreases expected manipulation cost, its
impact on expected compensation depends on pl, as described above. When pl
is high, monitoring increases the manager’s expected rent because it increases
expected compensation and decreases expected manipulation cost. When pl
is low, however, monitoring reduces expected compensation but also reduces
expected manipulation cost. Since the manipulation level significantly de-
creases when k increases and pl is low, the latter effect always dominates
the former such that the manager’s expected rent increases in k. Therefore,
when the investment outcomes are contractible, the manager’s expected rent
always increases in the monitoring level. This result is in contrast to the con-
ventional argument that monitoring limits managerial rents. The following
proposition summarizes the relationships between monitoring, expected com-
pensation, and managerial rents when the investment outcomes can be used
for contracting purposes.
Proposition 5.5. When the investment outcomes are contractible, as k in-
creases,
(i) managerial rents increase, dUco
dk
> 0, and
(ii) holding ph and q constant, if pl < p
∗
l , expected compensation decreases in
k, dCco
dk
≤ 0, and if pl ≥ p∗l , expected compensation increases in k, dCcodk ≥ 0.
The threshold p∗l is shown in Appendix B.
The results in Proposition 5.5 show that when the investment out-
comes are contractible, monitoring always increases managerial rents but can
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increase or decrease expected compensation. It is important to note that the
results that monitoring affects expected compensation and managerial rents
crucially rely on the assumption that manipulation is costly to the manager.
Suppose manipulation is costless such that k = 0. In this case, the manager’s
communication is unrestricted and the revelation principle holds. As a con-
sequence, shareholders will choose one the following two options to maximize
firm value. The first option is to offer a compensation contract that eliminates
manipulation activities. In this contract, the following conditions hold:
w (θl) = Pr (λh|sl, ph)w (R) and w (θh) = w (0) = 0. (5.7)
Substituting (5.7) into (5.2), we obtain mh = 0. This contract allows
shareholders to make an efficient project continuation decision (see Chapter 6)
but significantly increases the cost of incentive contracting. The second option
is to commit to never liquidate the project. With this commitment, the man-
ager no longer has an incentive to manipulate the interim accounting report.
Although this commitment eliminates accounting manipulation, investment
inefficiency arises because some projects that should have been liquidated are
continued. In either option, monitoring has no impact on expected compen-
sation or managerial rents because accounting manipulation does not exist in
equilibrium.
Even when the revelation principle does not hold (i.e. manipulation
exists in equilibrium), monitoring may not affect expected compensation or
managerial rents when manipulation is costless. As shown in Lemma 5.4, when
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the manager can manipulate the report but the manipulation incentive does
not depend on the effort level, there is no association between (i) monitoring
and expected compensation or (ii) monitoring and managerial rents.
5.1 Discussion
The analysis thus far relies on the assumption that k > kmin > k0.
When this assumption holds, the optimal contract sets w (R) > 0 and w (θh) =
w (θl) = w (0) = 0. The analysis becomes more complicated when this assump-
tion is relaxed (i.e. k < k0). In this discussion section, I offer some conjectures
on how the results differ when k < k0.
Suppose k < k0, the manager’s manipulation incentive is significantly
high. To reduce this manipulation incentive, shareholders optimally set w (θl) >
0. Since the manager now receives a positive pay when the accounting report
is low, he has less incentive to exert high productive effort. To ensure that the
manager is incentivized to supply high productive effort, shareholders must
increase the bonus offered to the manager when the long-term investment
outcome is high, w (R). This analysis suggests that it is not optimal for share-
holders to choose k < k0 because the only benefit of choosing a low monitoring
level is to reduce the bonus level required to induce high managerial effort. In
other words, expected compensation when k < k0 is greater than expected
compensation when k > k0.
Although choosing k < k0 does not benefit shareholders due to an
increase in expected compensation, it can benefit the manager. This is because
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when w (θl) > 0, the manager is able to extract higher rents from the firm.
Thus, whether the manager prefers k < k0 or k > k0 depends on how weak
the monitoring system can be. If the manager can implement a sufficiently
weak monitoring system, it can be optimal for him to choose k < k0. However,
if the manager cannot implement a sufficiently weak monitoring system (e.g.
due to regulatory requirements or other monitoring mechanisms), it is optimal
for him to implement a strong monitoring system (k = kmax) because when
k > k0, monitoring increases managerial rents, as shown in Proposition 5.5.
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Chapter 6
Monitoring and Investment Efficiency
In Chapter 4 and 5, I show how a monitoring system that constrains
accounting manipulation activities affects incentive contracting. Although the
optimal incentive contract induces the manager to exert high productive effort,
it also provides incentives for him to manipulate accounting reports. In this
chapter, I examine how manipulation incentives (and a monitoring system that
constrains them) affect investment efficiency.
Since L ≥ Pr (λh|sl, ph)R, by assumption, it is first-best optimal to
liquidate the project when s = sl. In addition, the following assumption




(ph − pl) q
)
> L
implies that it is first-best optimal to continue the project when s = sh. Given
that shareholders find it optimal to continue the project when θ = θh and
to liquidate it when θ = θl, if the manager does not manipulate the report,
the first-best project continuation decision is achieved as the project is always
continued when s = sh and is always liquidated when s = sl. Accounting
manipulation distorts the information contained in the accounting report and
thus distorts investment efficiency. As shown in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the
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manager has an incentive to engage in manipulation activities when s = sl
but does not manipulate the report when s = sh. Consequently, investment
inefficiency arises when s = sl and the manager successfully manipulates the
accounting report. Using this argument, the project’s expected return, Π, can
be expressed as follows:
Π = phqR + Pr (sl|ph)L− Pr (sl|ph)m (L− Pr (λh|sl, ph)R) . (6.1)
The first part of (6.1), phqR+Pr (sl|ph)L, is the project’s expected return when
the project is continued if and only if s = sh (the first-best expected return).
The second part of (6.1), Pr (sl|ph)m (L− Pr (λh|sl, ph)R), is the expected
cost of investment inefficiency, where Pr (sl|ph) is the probability that s = sl,
m is the manipulation level, and (L− Pr (λh|sl, ph)R) is the opportunity cost
of continuing a project that should have been liquidated.
As monitoring becomes more intense, the manipulation level decreases,
and the probability that shareholders make the inefficient project continua-
tion decision decreases. The impact of monitoring on the overall reduction
in expected cost of investment inefficiency depends on the opportunity cost
of inefficient project continuation decisions, (L− Pr (λh|sl, ph)R). Specifi-
cally, the opportunity cost of making inefficient project continuation deci-
sions increases in L. Consider an extreme case when L is very low, L =
limε→0+ (Pr (λh|sl, ph)R + ε). In this case, the opportunity cost of continuing
a project that should have been liquidated is very low and therefore con-
straining manipulation via monitoring improves the project’s expected return
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only by a small margin. As L increases, the opportunity cost of making the
incorrect project continuation decision increases. Consequently, a monitoring
system that constrains manipulation activities has a larger impact on the over-
all investment efficiency when L is high than when L is low. The following
proposition summarizes the results in this chapter.
Proposition 6.1. As k increases, investment efficiency and the project’s ex-
pected return increase, dΠ
dk
> 0. This effect is stronger when the opportunity







Having analyzed the effects of monitoring on optimal incentive con-
tracts and investment efficiency, in this chapter, I derive the optimal monitor-
ing system and show the effect of the relative power in influencing a monitoring
system between managers and shareholders on optimal monitoring intensity.
When the investment outcomes are not contractible, monitoring in-
creases shareholder value because it reduces expected compensation (Proposi-
tion 4.3) as well as increases investment efficiency (Proposition 6.1). Therefore,
shareholders, who wish to maximize shareholder value, prefer an intense mon-
itoring system, kS = kmax. In contrast, the manager, who wishes to maximize
his rents, prefers a weak monitoring system, kM = kmin, because monitoring
decreases his expected rent (Proposition 4.3). Since the manager and share-
holders prefer a different monitoring system, the implemented monitoring in-
tensity is
k∗no = αkmin + (1− α) kmax.
As the degree of managerial influence over a monitoring system, α, increases,
the level of monitoring declines. This result is consistent with the conventional
view that managerial power in influencing a monitoring system is negatively
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associated with monitoring intensity. The following proposition summarizes
this result.
Proposition 7.1. When the investment outcomes are not contractible, the
implemented monitoring system is k∗no = αkmin+(1− α) kmax. This monitoring






When shareholders can use the investment outcomes for contracting
purposes, however, these results no longer hold. The results in Proposition
5.5 show that the manager’s expected rent increases in monitoring inten-
sity. Consequently, the manager always prefers an intense monitoring system,
kM = kmax. Shareholders may agree or disagree with the manager regarding
the monitoring technology. When pl is sufficiently low, an increase in k not
only reduces expected compensation (Proposition 5.5) but also improves in-
vestment efficiency (Proposition 6.1), resulting in an increase in shareholder
value. Therefore, when pl is sufficiently low, shareholders also prefer an intense
monitoring system, kS = kmax. Since both the manager and shareholders pre-
fer intense monitoring, kmax is implemented and the relative power between the
manager and shareholders has no impact on the optimal monitoring system.
When pl is sufficiently high, monitoring increases both investment ef-
ficiency and expected compensation. The net effect of monitoring on share-
holder value depends on the strength of these two forces. When L is high, the
former effect dominates the latter such that monitoring increases shareholder
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value. Thus, when both pl and L are high, shareholders prefer intense monitor-
ing, kS = kmax, which is consistent with the manager’s preference. As a result,
the implemented monitoring is kmax. Note that in this case, shareholders pre-
fer intense monitoring although monitoring increases expected compensation.
Thus, a positive association between monitoring and expected compensation
does not necessarily imply that shareholders prefer a weak monitoring system.
Finally, when pl is sufficiently high and L is low, the effect of moni-
toring in increasing expected compensation dominates its effect in improving
investment efficiency such that monitoring reduces shareholder value. There-
fore, shareholders prefer weak monitoring while the manager prefers intense
monitoring. The implemented monitoring is k∗co = αkmax + (1− α) kmin, im-
plying that managerial power in influencing a monitoring system is positively




= kmax − kmin > 0. These results
are in sharp contrast to the conventional argument that monitoring benefits
shareholders and imposes costs on managers. Instead, these results show that
when both managers and shareholders can influence a monitoring system, man-
agers will attempt to implement a strong system while shareholders will try
to weaken it. These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 7.2. When the investment outcomes are contractible,
(i) if pl < p
∗
l , the implemented monitoring technology is k
∗
co = kmax,
(ii) if pl ≥ p∗l and L ≥ L∗, the implemented monitoring technology is k∗co =
kmax, and
(iii) if pl ≥ p∗l and L < L∗, the implemented monitoring technology is k∗co =
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αkmax + (1− α) kmin, and this monitoring intensity increases in the degree of





The threshold L∗ is defined in Appendix B.
The results in part (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7.2 show that monitor-
ing can increase shareholder value and managerial rents simultaneously. The
intuition behind this result is that monitoring reduces the deadweight loss
associated with expected manipulation cost incurred by the manager as well
as the cost of inefficient investment decisions. Therefore, when the gain from
the reduction in this deadweight loss is shared between shareholders and man-
agers, both shareholders and managers are better off with increased monitor-
ing. However, in part (iii) of Proposition 7.2, monitoring improves managerial
welfare at the expense of shareholders because the effect of monitoring in in-
creasing the cost of incentive contracting outweighs its benefit in improving
investment efficiency.
Table 7.1 summarizes the directional effects of monitoring on the ma-
nipulation level, investment efficiency, the bonus level, expected compensation,
managerial rents, and shareholder value. As shown in Table 7.1, monitoring
can either (i) increase shareholder value and decrease managerial rents, (ii) de-
crease shareholder value and increase managerial rents, or (iii) simultaneously
increase both shareholder value and managerial rents. In addition, sharehold-
ers may find it optimal to implement a monitoring system that results in a
high level of expected compensation and a high level of managerial rents (con-
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tractible outcomes, pl ≥ p∗l , L ≥ L∗) or results in a high level of accounting
manipulation (contractible outcomes, pl ≥ p∗l , L < L∗). In a similar vein,
the manager may prefer a strong monitoring system even when monitoring



































































































































































































In this chapter, I provide some empirical implications of the results in
this study. The focus of this paper is on a monitoring mechanism that increases
the marginal cost of manipulation and thus constrains manipulation activities.
Although the model focuses on financial reporting processes in which managers
manipulate information in financial statements, it is important to note that the
implication of the results in this study can be extended to other settings. For
example, one can think of a managerial accounting setting in which a regional
manager works on a project and is required to submit interim performance
reports to the headquarter while the headquarter can terminate the project.
That being said, testing empirical predictions using managerial accounting
data can be challenging due to data availability. Therefore, the emphasis of
this empirical implication chapter is on financial accounting.
I discuss the empirical implication of the analysis by focusing on two
monitoring mechanisms—internal controls and boards of directors. These two
mechanisms are appropriate proxies for monitoring in this setting because prior
empirical studies have shown that both internal controls and boards of direc-
tors reduce manipulation activities. For example, Doyle et al. (2007) docu-
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ment a positive association between internal control weaknesses and estimated
accruals that are not realized as cash flows. In addition, Ashbaugh-Skaife et
al. (2008) show that firms with internal control deficiencies have lower qual-
ity accruals than firms with no internal control deficiencies. Similarly, prior
studies show that board independence, audit committee independence, and
audit committee financial expertise are negatively associated with abnormal
accruals (Klein 2002, Peasnell et al. 2005, Xie et al. 2003) and restatements
(Abbott et al. 2004, Agrawal and Chadha 2005, Carcello et al. 2011).
The analysis in Chapter 6 shows the relationship between monitoring
and investment efficiency. Specifically, the result in Proposition 6.1 suggests
that monitoring intensity is positively associated with investment efficiency.
Prior empirical studies document evidence consistent with this result. Cheng
et al. (2013) show that firms with material weaknesses in internal controls
have less efficient investment and that this effect is mitigated when firms re-
mediate control weaknesses. Similarly, Feng et al. (2015) show that material
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting are negatively associ-
ated with return on assets. Finally, McNichols and Stubben (2008) document a
positive association between earnings manipulation and overinvestment prob-
lems, suggesting that constraining manipulation via monitoring reduces the
degrees of overinvestment.
The results in this study also show the relationships between moni-
toring and expected compensation. When the investment outcomes are not
contractible or when they are contractible and the agency friction is not se-
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vere (pl is low), monitoring reduces expected compensation. However, when
the investment outcomes are contractible and the agency friction is severe (pl
is high), monitoring increases expected compensation. The result that moni-
toring can be positively or negatively associated with expected compensation
is consistent with mixed findings documented in prior empirical studies. For
example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) show a negative association be-
tween monitoring and expected compensation by documenting a decrease in
CEO compensation following the implementation of rules requiring indepen-
dent boards. However, Hoitash et al. (2012) show that CFO compensation
decreases in internal control material weaknesses, suggesting a positive associ-
ation between monitoring and compensation. In addition, Core et al. (1999)
show a positive relation between CEO compensation and a percentage of the
board composed of outside directors.
A similar argument can be made with respect to the relationships be-
tween monitoring and firm value. The results in Proposition 4.3, Proposition
5.5, and Proposition 6.1 predict that monitoring decreases firm value when
the investment outcomes are contractible, the agency friction is severe, and
the cost of inefficient project continuation decisions is low. For all other firms,
monitoring increases firm value. This ambiguous effect of monitoring on firm
value is also consistent with mixed empirical evidence shown in prior studies.
For example, Bhagat and Black (2002) find no association between the degree
of board independence and firm value. In contrast, relying on the argument
that small boards are better at monitoring than large boards, Yermack (1996)
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shows a negative association between board size and firm value. DeFond et
al. (2005) examine market reactions after firms appoint financial experts to
their audit committees and show that the appointment of accounting finan-
cial experts assigned to audit committees has a positive impact on market
reactions.
Finally, the results in this study have implications for the relation be-
tween manipulation levels and bonus levels. Specifically, both the bonus level
(w (θh) or w (R)) and the manipulation level are determined by monitoring
intensity, k. Furthermore, these two variables affect each other as the bonus
affects the manipulation incentive which, in turn, affects the optimal bonus
level required to induce high managerial effort. When the investment out-
comes are not contractible, I show that monitoring decreases both the bonus
level and manipulation incentive (Proposition 4.1), suggesting a positive rela-
tion between these two variables. In contrast, when the investment outcomes
are contractible, monitoring increases the bonus level but decreases manipu-
lation incentive (Proposition 5.3), suggesting a negative relation between the
bonus level and the manipulation level. Therefore, the analysis in this study
shows that the relation between manipulation levels and the bonus level can
be positive or negative, as summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 8.1. When the investment outcomes are not contractible (are con-





This study shows an unintended consequence of constraining manipu-
lation via monitoring on shareholder value and managerial rents. Contrary to
the notion that shareholders are better off and managers are worse off with
increased monitoring, this study shows that constraining manipulation via
monitoring can reduce shareholder value and increase managerial rents be-
cause monitoring can make it harder to induce managerial effort. This result
follows because managers have incentives to manipulate accounting informa-
tion to convince shareholders to continue the project, and these manipulation
incentives are stronger when managers exert high productive effort than when
they choose low productive effort. Allowing manipulation therefore makes
it more attractive for managers to supply high productive effort because the
likelihood of obtaining a bonus significantly increases. This result suggests
that restricting manipulation via monitoring can increase the cost of incentive
contracting. In addition, the analysis shows that an increase in monitoring
intensity can be Pareto-optimal, as both shareholders and managers benefit
from increased monitoring.
The results of this study suggest many implications that contrast with
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conventional wisdom. For example, shareholders may prefer a weak monitor-
ing system that leads to a high level of accounting manipulation. Additionally,
shareholders may optimally implement a monitoring system that results in a
high level of expected compensation and managerial rents. In the same vein,
managers may be better off in a monitoring environment where expected com-
pensation is low. Finally, as managerial power over a monitoring system in-
creases, optimal monitoring intensity can remain unaffected or increase rather
than decrease.
This study can be extended in several ways. As an example, in this
study, the accuracy of information is exogenously given and is publicly ob-
served. Future studies can endogenize this variable or consider cases in which
this information is privately observed by the manager or shareholders. Another
extension would be to examine multiple roles of monitoring in an organization.
In order to focus on the effect of monitoring on accounting information, this
study examines one role of monitoring—to constrain accounting manipulation
activities. Future research could analyze other roles of monitoring, including
learning about project quality or managerial effort, and examine the interac-






λh High quality project
λl Low quality project
R Long-term investment outcome when the project quality is high
L Liquidation value
ph Probability that the project quality is high given high managerial effort
pl Probability that the project quality is high given low managerial effort
b Cost of high effort
sh High interim signal
sl Low interim signal
q Probability that the signal is accurate
θh High accounting report
θl Low accounting report
m Manipulation level (probability that manipulation is successful)
mh Manipulation level when the manager exerts high effort
ml Manipulation level when the manager exerts low effort
k Monitoring intensity (marginal cost of manipulation)
kM Monitoring level proposed by the manager
kS Monitoring level proposed by shareholders
α Relative degree of managerial influence over a monitoring system
w (θh) Manager’s pay when the accounting report is high
w (θl) Manager’s pay when the accounting report is low
w (R) Manager’s pay when the long-term investment outcome is high
w (0) Manager’s pay when the long-term investment outcome is low
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V Shareholder value
Π Expected return from the investment project
C Expected compensation
U Managerial rents
no Non-contractible investment outcomes




Proof of Proposition 4.1
Suppose w (θh) > w (θl). If the manager observes sh, he does not
manipulate the report and obtains w (θh). If he observes sl, he chooses the
manipulation level, m, that maximizes the following utility function.
Uno (sl) = mw (θh) + (1−m)w (θl)− 0.5km2. (B.1)
Taking the first-order condition of (B.1), yields
m =
w (θh)− w (θl)
k
. (B.2)
Using (B.1) and (B.2), the incentive compatibility constraint is
(Pr (sh|ph)− Pr (sh|pl))
(
w (θh)− w (θl)− 0.5km2
)
≥ b. (B.3)
Substituting (B.2) into (B.3) and solving the inequality, we obtain





k (ph − pl) (2q − 1)
)
.
Thus, the optimal contract is as follows.





k (ph − pl) (2q − 1)
)
(B.4)
w (θl) = 0.
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k (ph − pl) (2q − 1)
)
. (B.5)
Proof of Proposition 4.2





































< 0, as just established.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Using (4.1), we obtain
dCno
dk
= (Pr (sh|ph) + Pr (sl|ph)m)
dw (θh)
dk




































Proof of Proposition 5.1
The Lagrangian of the shareholders’ optimization problem is as follows:
maxG = phqR + Pr (sl|ph) (mh Pr (λh|sl, ph)R + (1−mh)L)
−phq (w (θh) + w (R))− (1− ph) (1− q) (w (θh) + w (0))
−Pr (sl|ph)
(











Pr (sl|ph) (w (θl) + 0.5km2h)
(ph − pl)
− µ1
Pr (sl|pl) (w (θl) + 0.5km2l )
(ph − pl)
+µ2 ((w (θh) + Pr (λh|sl, ph)w (R) + Pr (λl|sl, ph)w (0)))
+µ3 ((w (θh) + Pr (λh|sl, pl)w (R) + Pr (λl|sl, pl)w (0)))
−µ2 (w (θl) +mhk)− µ3 (w (θl) +mlk)
where µ1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the effort incentive con-
straint, µ2 is the multiplier associated with the manipulation constraint when
the manager exerts high effort, and µ3 is the multiplier associated with the
manipulation constraint when the manager exerts low effort.
The necessary conditions for a solution include: ∂G
∂w(i)
w (i) = 0 for i ∈
{θh, θl, R, 0}, and ∂G∂mjmj = 0 for j ∈ {h, l}.
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Assume that in the optimal solution, w (R) > 0 and w (θl) = 0. This



















= 0, we obtain
µ∗1 =
(ph − pl) (phq + 2ph (1− q)mh)
(q (ph − pl) + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
− (ph − pl) ph (1− q) (Pr (λh|sl, ph)R− L)
k (q (ph − pl) + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
µ∗2 =
Pr (sl|ph) (Pr (λh|sl, ph)R− L)
k











3, (5.2), and w (θl) = 0, it can be shown that
∂G
∂w (θh)



















(Pr (λh|sl, ph)R− L) (ph − pl)
(
ph (1− q)2 + (1− ph) q2
)
k (q (ph − pl) + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
+
(Pr (λh|sl, ph)R− L) (ph − pl) q (1− q)ml
k (q (ph − pl) + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
− (phq + 2ph (1− q)mh) (1− q) (ph − pl)
(q (ph − pl) + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
+
(phq + 2ph (1− q)mh) ((1− ph) qmh − (1− pl) qml)
(q (ph − pl) + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
− (1− ph) (1− q)− 2 (1− ph) qmh,
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which is negative for all 0 < pl < ph < 1 and q ∈ (0.5, 1). Therefore, it is
optimal to set w (0) = 0 and w (θh) = 0.
In addition, it can be shown that
∂G
∂w (θl)
= −Pr (sl|ph) + µ∗1
Pr (sh|pl)− Pr (sh|ph)
(ph − pl)






= −Pr (sl|ph) +
ph (Pr (sh|pl)− Pr (sh|ph))
(ph − pl)







< 0 for all 0 < pl < ph < 1 and q ∈ (0.5, 1). These results
suggest that there exists k0 such that when k ≥ k0, the optimal contract sets
w (θl) = 0.
Given that w (R) > 0 and w (θh) = w (θl) = w (0) = 0, the incentive
compatibility constraint can be written as follows.
phqw (R) + Pr (sl|ph)
(
0.5k (mh)
2)− b ≥ plqw (R) + Pr (sl|pl) (0.5k (ml)2) .
(B.7)
Substituting (5.3) into (B.7) and solving the inequality, we obtain
w (R) ≥ k
− (ph − pl) q +
√
(ph − pl)2 q2 + 2b(1−q)(ph Pr(λh|sl,ph)−pl Pr(λh|sl,pl))k
(1− q) (ph Pr (λh|sl, ph)− pl Pr (λh|sl, pl))
 .
Therefore, the optimal bonus level is
w (R) = k
− (ph − pl) q +
√
(ph − pl)2 q2 + 2b(1−q)(ph Pr(λh|sl,ph)−pl Pr(λh|sl,pl))k
(1− q) (ph Pr (λh|sl, ph)− pl Pr (λh|sl, pl))
 ,
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and the manipulation level is
mh =
Pr (λh|sl, ph)w (R)
k
. (B.8)
Proof of Lemma 5.2
Using (5.3), the manipulation level is
m =
Pr (λh|sl, p)w (R)
k
.
Since Pr (λh|sl, ph) > Pr (λh|sl, pl), it follows that mh > ml.





2)− Pr (sl|ph) (0.5k (mh)2)
(ph − pl) q
. (B.9)


















































(ph − pl) q + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml
. (B.11)




















+ pl (1− q) mlmh2 − (ph − pl) qmh








(phmh − plml)− (ph − pl) qmh
(ph − pl) q + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml
)
< 0. (B.13)
















−ph (1− q) mhml2 + pl (1− q)
m2l
2
− (ph − pl) qmh








(phmh − plml)− (ph − pl) qml
(ph − pl) q + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml
)
< 0. (B.15)


















(phmh − plml) (1− q)w (R)
2k ((ph − pl) q + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
,
which is positive because mh > ml (Lemma 5.2).
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Proof of Lemma 5.4
Suppose w (R) > 0 and w (θh) = w (θl) = w (0) = 0. The incentive
compatibility constraint is
(phq + ph (1− q)m0 (k))w (R)− b ≥ (plq + pl (1− q)m0 (k))w (R) . (B.16)
Solving (B.16), we obtain
w (R) =
b
(ph − pl) (q + (1− q)m0 (k))
.
Expected compensation is




and the manager’s expected rent is











Proof of Proposition 5.5
Using (5.4), we obtain
dCco
dk
= (phq + ph (1− q)mh)
dw (R)
dk
+ ph (1− q)w (R)
dmh
dk
= (phq + 2ph (1− q)mh)
dw (R)
dk




























. When pl ≥ p∗l , (2phplq + plq − phpl − phq) ≥ 0,
and dCco
dk


































phplq (1− q)w (R) (mh −ml)
2k ((ph − pl) q + ph (1− q)mh − pl (1− q)ml)
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.1













which is positive because (L− Pr (λh|sl, ph)R) > 0, by assumption,
and dm
dk










Proof of Proposition 7.1
It follows from the results in Proposition 4.3 that kM = kmin. In addi-
tion, shareholder value (V ) can be expressed as follows.
V = Π− Cno.
Since dΠ
dk
> 0 (Proposition 6.1) and dCno
dk
< 0 (Proposition 4.3), it follows
that dV
dk
> 0 and kS = kmax. Thus, k
∗
no = αkmin + (1− α) kmax. In addition,
dk∗no
dα
= kmin − kmax < 0.
Proof of Proposition 7.2
L∗ is defined as follows.





Note that when pl > p
∗
l , we obtain L




It follows from the results in Proposition 5.5 that kM = kmax. In addi-
tion, shareholder value (V ) is




> 0 (Proposition 6.1).
Part (i): When p < p∗l ,
dCco
dk
≤ 0 (Proposition 5.5). Thus, it follows that
dV
dk
> 0 and kS = kmax. Since kM = kS, the optimal monitoring is k
∗
co = kmax.
Part (ii): When p ≥ p∗l and L ≥ L∗, it follows that
dV
dk






Thus, ks = kmax and the optimal monitoring is k
∗
co = kmax.
Part (iii): When p ≥ p∗l and L < L∗, it follows that
dV
dk






Thus, ks = kmin and the optimal monitoring is k
∗
co = αkmax+(1− α) kmin,




= kmax − kmin > 0.
Proof that shareholders find it optimal to continue (to liqui-
date) the project when θ = θh (θ = θl).
When the investment outcomes are not contractible:
The optimal contract sets w (θh) > 0 and w (θl) = 0.
Suppose θ = θl. Expected shareholder value if the project is continued
is Pr (λh|sl, ph)R − w (θl) = Pr (λh|sl, ph)R. If the project is liquidated, ex-
pected shareholder value is L−w (θl) = L. Therefore, it is optimal to liquidate
the project because L ≥ Pr (λh|sl, ph)R, by assumption.
66
Suppose θ = θh. Expected shareholder value if the project is continued
is (
phq + ph (1− q)m





phq + ph (1− q)
phq + (1− ph) (1− q) + (ph (1− q) + (1− ph) q)
)
R− w (θh)
= phR− w (θh) .
If the project is liquidated, expected shareholder value is L − w (θh).




(ph − pl) q
)
> L
implies phR > L.
When the investment outcomes are contractible:
The optimal contract sets w (R) > 0 and w (θh) = w (θl) = w (0) = 0.
Suppose θ = θl. Expected shareholder value if the project is continued
is Pr (λh|sl, ph) (R− w (R)). If the project is liquidated, expected shareholder
value is L−w (θl) = L. Therefore, it is optimal to liquidate the project because
the assumption L ≥ Pr (λh|sl, ph)R implies L > Pr (λh|sl, ph) (R− w (R)).
Suppose θ = θh. Expected shareholder value if the project is continued
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is (
phq + ph (1− q)mh





phq + ph (1− q)
phq + (1− ph) (1− q) + (ph (1− q) + (1− ph) q)
)
(R− w (R))
















> 0 (Proposition 5.3) and kmax <∞.
Using w (R) =
b+Pr(sl|pl)(0.5km2l )−Pr(sl|ph)(0.5km2h)
(ph−pl)q




. If the project is liquidated, expected shareholder






> L, by assumption.
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